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J!LSTr~f\

D. BI:iJ':TIJ,

vc,.~

Case No. 11096

JOllil \·!, TURNS!<,, i·.larcl• n,
~~

Slate Prison 1

Respondent.

BRIEF

OF

STATEMENT OF

APPELLANT

t:l\.TU:~E

OF CASE

The appellant Chester Brown app2als from a judgment
of the District Court of Salt Lake County denying his peti-

•lion for releuse by writ of habeas corpus with respect to
his commitment in Case No. 7231 in the District Court of
10

.'eber County and his cormnitment in Case No. 19678 in the

'District Court of Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN LO\\IER COURT
On March 11, 1963, Chc:ster DroHn pleaded guilty

to

ch" cTirnc of issuing a clwc:k ag0inst insufficient funds before

.th<? llonc>L~abJc ParJcy E. Nc•rselh in U1C Scc:und ,"Judicial Dis:ict Coutt, St0tc of UL,1h.

1

On Mcty 13, 1963, he was sentenced

i
IJ,,,

h

of

0,1

I

-

C\'l'.f,1.1l led tu

lh~:

l1U1li :;t;1tc Prison.

While on p0role

cind lc11:ce:ny before the Honorable Mctrcellus K. Snow in

dlic Di strict Court of the Third Judicial District and was
2'1ii

i

ct•ced to be convni tted to the Utah State Prison on April

28, 1966.

On Februacy 7, 19G7, Mr. Brown filed a petition for
1'!Ii

t of habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake

Cotrnty.

The petition alleged that Mr. Brown

was without

counsel because the court did not fully advise him of his
right to counsel in the 1963 case, and it alleged that he

I involuntarily
i

entered a plea of guilty in the 1966 case.

On November 2, 19G7, a hearing on the writ was held

I

before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft in the District Court
of Solt Lake County.

On November 2, 1967, Judge Croft entered his order

i

denying p2ti tion for writ of habeas corpus with respect to

j both

co:nmj_ tmen ts.

The court found that in the 1963 case

Hr. BrovJn ~1as given adequate notice of his right to counsel,

I

I

'did understandingly waive that right, and was correctly
lciJ cJ of the consequences of his pleu.

1

t\v1t Mc. Brown voluntciri ly

The court also found

entered a plea of guilty in the

-2-

/\1>1,=·J J cint

liOJl f

ui:·

Scilt L.cl]J'

vir_ :it

rcvc r ~,,i J Clf th(_: c1cnio 1 of th•o pc ti-·

:;~ckco

hahcc1:;

(!

Couril

CC>r lJUS

l_;y lhr: D:Lslrict Court of

1:1ith respect to b'Jl-

xwictions.

STATEl11FJJT OF Flier
Chesler Drown, a prisoner at the Utah State Prison,
Draper, Utah, filed a petj i ion

fo1~

a ·writ of habeas corpus

in the District Court of Salt Lak•'" County.

attacked the validity

The petition

c£ his i111pd_sonrnent on two convictions.

As to the first conviction, the complaint alleged

that during proceedings in the District Court of Weber
County #7231 at which petitjoner pleaded guilty, he was without aid of cou
~

l because he had been improperly advised

his right b

Junsel.

At the he

'_ng on the complaint, the transcript of
n Case 7231 were introduced into evidence

lhe proceeding~,
as Exhibit P-2

1/

(R. 4):

In Case 7231 appellant was charged

11ith issuing a check against insufficient funds.
lids

on ,July 11, 1963 before

~Jl'"\Je

Norseth.

Arraignment

At this time,

the court inform

peti tionc·L- l h8t the charge carried with

it a peni tentii1r)

'ntcnce <:•11 ~ informed him that he was en-

- (1)

The transcLi r
of Case 7231 onc1 Case 19678 will be referred to ro " "
The lri.mscript of the hearing on the
will will be n_·fcrred to as "R".

-3-

I''

;;' L.c-'l'ik'Y

:1•

1-,, 1

J

Ii

•

1':

for h.hn

c'11lcxl by an uUornoy, but the court

jf

he couldn't afford one.

Till' l',-~lj ti0;1cr indicated that he

then p1c0clod guilty (T. 2).
nol

~

(T. 2).

waived the attorney and

The court on March 18, 1967,

.. >\.'in0 \\1hetl1er there was anything

wrong mentally

ilh the petitioner sent him to the State Mental Hospital

11

for obsecvc:ition (T.

3).

Judge Norseth stated that the

reporC. from the State Mental Hospital showed that petitioner
1·1as distL1:-1_,2d,

but not insane (T. 4).

On May 13, 1963,

peti Uon2r was sentenced to the State Penitentiary (T. 6).
At trial in this case on d{rect examination relating

to Case 7231, appellant stated that if he had had money
he wou1d hu_ve liked an

fell he might
(R, 8).

a;

attorney, but since he did not, he

well plead guilty and get i t over with

Appellant indicated that he pleaded guilty because

off:icers had threatened to prosecute him as an habitual
criminal if he didn't plead guilty (R. 8).
· th;:it he knew there was no use contacting an

He testified
cl::torney because

he dic1 not have cmy money to pay him (R. 9).

Appellant
he

WciS

estifiec1 that.. .1e did not understand that

waiving his right to an attorney though he couldn't

i1ffo1-c1 one (R. 10).

Appellant indicated the court had not
-4-

i 1'.J

j

n cou ,- L

o

end 1934 (!\. 28).
1:110

App2Jlcmt stalcc.cl th;-it the two officers

hc.td thrca tcned to have hi 111 yros•:cutE.d

~

c•

Cl,._")

a h3bitual

cri1iiinal H:::re pJain cJc,U1C'c, policcs'.'1c·n and one was named
:trvcns (E.

30).

He a1:=:~' indicated thr

officers had not

th:·ec:1lenco him physically, but he fc,:11 ed they rnight harm
hir:1 because' they hc1d u reputatior. of working fellows over.

l'ppclJ<int indicated i t

WcJS

a casti' l <:icquuintance who had

loJd him of this repulc1L:i on but he co'Jld not recall any
n°1111cs

(I\.

31).

He also staled that counsel durin;i- the 1942

c111'1 J93·1 c<:1ses \·:ct-e cou:·t appointr·cl (R. 32), a~1d he knew

1:1H· JCJ,J? cci~~c the cc,ud. lnd C1clvisccl h:irn tll.::it it would

-5-

l

, .

L

I

l' ·

~

'~

i

\

i

: '

·' L

11..J,i

lr,<1 k1:;

l i I:

1111'

b~'C'n

in

l'~•.

lh' 1:.111lcd :i1,1il1iJe jn 19(,3

!1i1:, :ii

i, 1 1_

of lii.s

plc,~t

in 1963 hl' hi1d for--

told hj1,1 :in 1942 (R. 44).

l~lcd,

but that i t

Appellant

was the failure of

co1y: l- to indicci te tli<d.: counsol 1·1ould be provided by
cc '.ll_ t ll 1C1 i
1

l\S

s:toppcd him

frorn stating his desires

to tho second conviction for grand larceny and

r:·'l>c1y, th::: complaint alleged that in Case 19678, District

Ccilli:t o:[ S<:ilt LC11<:e County, on April 28, 1966, petitioner
:in1'~>ln11ic:•:ily

entered a plea of guilty.

At the hc0ring on the compluint the transcript
the

i11

occcc:ciir19s in Case 196 78 were introduced into

cle::nc:E: c:is Exhibits P·-4 (R. 5).

In Case 19678 upon

of

ariarraign·

rncnt on Mcicch 28, 1966, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty to

charge~

as::"'i·t(.J in.sanity.
\·'cJ.c;

of robbery and grand larceny and also
On !1pril 19, 1966, a sanity hearing

liclcl b fore .1uc10c Mcffccllus K. Sno1v and appellant was

_-j U' l_r~J .~

:.

<1p11r:JJ:111l

:1

•

Oll ApdJ

28, 1966, the elate set for trial,

1-1dlJdt0i'f his plea of not guilty to the grand

J,,rc:criy ch<.tr9e cincl enlcrcd a pleo of guilty and the

-6-

'''J
([;. 1'.J).

\'lh'~n

Appellant l c ,

tr:icJl, but had cntc1cd '

he cl1c:1Ct f.cl his plea
1

the t he had vJ<mtecl a jury
. _c::i

er

guilty bc:·cause of threats

by pc.Jlicc oLC-icers to hc1ve an hai :i.tuul criminal charge
added lo

Ui2

other cl1r1i-ges (R. JC 17).

that he hcid told

rk.

Arpellant stated

J:ir,·:i J;itsur,~'CJCl he would like a jury

trial (H. 17),

that by cl 1cin0:ing h Le- plc::i to gu: J ty on thc:o grand larceny
clv:wgc he would be sc,nl. to the Utah State Pcni tentiary

rn.

40 .. 12).
Upon

direct cxcuninotjon: oppcJl2111t te::;lified that

h,, plcoclc-cl guilty to g1·c-1nci

Jan~,,ny

ace; cin l!c1bilniJ criminc:;l (R. 4'1-

~'1).

rccithci_· lhun get charged

He inc1icateJ that he

dicl nut t111JC'1·~;l,-11i:l C\'c'1-ytl1:i11,;i Judc_ic .SnOh' lo1c1 him (R. 45).
lie stCll~:d lh<1t h:is ccluczdion cnclcd in the eighth grade

(IL I)~;).

!le t<'stif:ied that he hi:ld told l'-11.-. O'Connell,

-7-

j

l<<;tif:i.cJ th;_1l he .represented appellant

I

Uk,t

cc:,

;c·

L the ti111c

o{

the final plea tl1cre were discus-

;, i c '"'· in J'u:.\12 Sno\.'' s chcJHUJ(TS bchJecn himself, the District

/',tlt. ·, 1ey\ an::.1 tl1e court (R. 48).
tl1[ :-

c::scnt cl.uring the discussion (R. 49).
c..·Lccl_ ll1c•t t11e State vJonted to

inc~_;(

the cou.c

stc::

Lh,: .::ipp2llant was sitting in the jury box and was

i i ,,_:"

no:.

1·.'.>111

J'!Jr. O'Conncll stated at

~

}12

c

v.rit11 trial, but

not ready for trial and felt a negotiated plea

\'.'.'3S

cm

procc~d

Mr. O'Connell

cciuitDble result (R. 49--50).

Mr. O'Connell

J Uic;t clfter the negotiations he came out and toJd

app2Jlant he had got a deal and couJd plead guilty to grand
lcircciJY (R,

50).

On c.Toss··cxarninaU.on, Mr. O'Connell stated he might
liC!v~·

toJd 21p;::icllimt how thc various parties at the negotia-

tjc,n:::; l!i:td fe]l

about the case (R. 52).

Mc. 0'Corme11 slated that he did not think Judge

ci:.:kr

cl fcJJ· c:1 jucy t.ric.d..

Mr. O'Connell indicated that no

-8-

Clr:J,dn~;l

hjn (!<. 5?.),

Mc. C:::cuJcl Gu1ic_J; y, fei,111cr1y of Ir::gal Defend'.::r's offir::E

lo be fiJccl in the case because of infoniation he hacJ recc-ivcd cc;ncen1:in9 uf-Ji':_:11ant's condition (R. 55--56).

Mr.

Gundry lestif:iPcl th21t he wos present at the mental hearing
held before Judge

Sn8\·J

rn.,

5 6) •

Mr. Gundry stated the

doctors stcJted that Mr. Bro\·m hF1d a sociopachic disorder
but v.'aS not psychotic (R.

56~57).

Vir. Gundry testified

that the cJoclors statcJ that TJr. Brown's problc1c1s stcrrmed
from addict ion to bar bi tun1 tes and from too n1cmy years of
irnpd_coorITT1ent

Oz.

57).

Upon cross--cxamination, J\lr. Gundry

indicated he wus pn:·sc:nt only

cl the hearing and not at thE

interview between the psychiatrists and Mr. Dro\·m (R. 58).
The Distcict

Coui~t

found the app2llant was not entit:

to the writ of ha1x;LJ.s corpus on either conviction.

POINT I
'J'lll; J lll:Jl:f\ COllJ\'l' Ll~l~l:D JN CONCI ,llli:J Nl~ TllAT J\PPCLL!\N'J' V( ll ,l/1 N/'.l\I l ,y J\f\l U JN n~l ,LJ Gf<Nfl ,y \\11\IVED HIS

-9--

'

'I

!I
j

I

i'

Ii

''

-1;:,· '1' '11) '('cl,;:,1,1, h 1 ,'i'l1"lcl1',!l !JI, 11:1:; NOi' I!H"Of:i]J:n

'"

1:1·, J,:1, ';,'

'1,1

l\111!'.'l'· /\J'l'(lJNTJ,ll COUN:-;1:L.

372 U,S, 335 (1963), held

r 1joy ri~1ht

tL·

c_,

of coun,"< J fOL' hi:::; defense is obligatory on

l c:tc:-c~ by virtue of the F'ow:'tE::cnth Amendment, and that

:,1.1.i9l11t clcfcnc10nt in a criminal prosecution in a state

cc·c'' l hc,c, the right to have coun:c-.cl appointed for him.

The r:igi1t to counsel cc:in be 1daivcd, but "It has

bcrJ 1

~,:jnlc;:1

p1·est 1 ;1ption

ri~Jit:·~
cf

out that 'courts must indulge every reasonable
agcd.nst waiver' of fundamental constitutional

and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss

fonclcr·.cntal rights'."

,John:c-:a::~·" Zci;:~:o-:_~,~ 304 U.S. 458,

jrc e:1ppli ri1bJ (~ to a.sscr tccl wc:ti v<::TS of the right to counsel

1
'

1p1 et,

cd 51(,:

"The record rnust sho\;J or there must be an
-10-·

i(

(l

'i

I

rf(

\

1

/ 1

•

J I {

1
) }

;,j

JIJ,1''

I I

:.o ,c;;il:Ls.Cy

the~

requ:i 1 er:: ,nt thot a c onfc;;s:i.on b2 voluntary

"In orclc·r fully lo cippr ise c:: pc:r son intccro~iJ.tE.d
of th~ c;:tc,d of hi.c; rights : 1dH- this 51y51tcr11
thC'11 1 _it is_necc~ s;- 1·y to \!i:l .. 1 h}rn ,r1'Jt cmly_ th~t
_hE:' }'w :;. U 12 .r:iCJh t tu .co:15 l1l t \. i th c:n c:ttor! 12y_ ,__Eu_!':
aJse> th.
:if h-:= :i:> :incJiqr•(1t '' la\,'yc1: \.·jJJ be a1~-.
pci:i.ntrc 1 'Ln rr·:Jr·c< ·· :11. hi111.
·, t:·1out thi~> c:1dcl:Ltional
\·:cffnirKJ l tJic CIOJ1t[)lJi lion o.\ "- h:c' ri9ht to consult
with cou!1sel \»'ouJd ofi.en h.c· un:1ec:c.tood as wcanin;J
only thc:1t h0 can co11su.lt '· 'i: 11 a le:1wyc::r :i.f. he has
0112 O!'.' has tl1e func':: to obt- jn one',
" (Emphasis
aclc1ed)

Al though Viiran:Ja
of tl1r~ S:ixl:.h Awe11drnc11t 1
Ciltio112

j

s not

con~coJ

ling as to the scope

the stat€ ,1""'nts 2re persuasive indi-

of tllc sla.ndard of lKOccciurcil sufegl1ccu-d.s required

-·] l -·

921 (J968), he:lc1 lhat the failure of the.!

(?,':J \',?cl
·.I

cc' :i 11fon1
l

c1jc1 11c::L

:::..)<~1 J,,.

cic~fc

ncli:1nt of his rjght to coucl-·apµointcd

deny ck:fc:ndc:int rds r:ight lo counsel undet..

ncl .:.·nt to U1c Constitut:ion.

4J5 P.2d 919 (1968),
~ir .·,. l:

Ut

'c

a case involving a

cc 1"l::itutional right than the
~~1

v.

\r~~1rkrr;c:22'

supra

i

The court based

.!'!~~.<?l:~:n ..v~.--'E:-~t;i:'._CE_

involved the: issue of whc·-

'' c1ci,.:r1clant mu.st be:: \.,rorncd of his right to court-·ap-·

r· i J ; Ii J.1 · r1c1nc11t to the
lcl l Ji:,I, 11

,_c] 01i

Fccl(~ra

J Cons ti tut ion.

p1:c· nir0nrlu shJndards,

The court

(an erroneous

1.11. fc:1ct~-.) clcfrncL--mt's conf(·o,sion di.d not vioLi':

1 i._ 1 1iL~;

unc1cr

th

F:ifth l\rncnclr11cnt although he wr.s
-1?--

iJt

told by police officers of his right to court-appointed

;ounsel.

The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment

rith w'.-1ich the Nielsen case was involved is retroactive.

;ideon v.
~herefore,

Wa~·!wright,

supra; Doughty v. Maxwell, supra.

we urge the court to overrule Nielsen v. Turner,

is it is based upon a case involving a different constitu-

tional right with standards which do not apply retroactively,
ind is directly in conflict with federal decisions in this
State.
In Pharris v. State, 424 P.2d 390 (Ida. 1967) 7 the
Idaho Supreme Court in an appeal from a denial of a writ
of habeas corpus held the appellant who had been told of
his right to counsel and asked if he wanted a lawyer but
had not been told of his right to court-appointed counsel

if he was indigent did not intelligently waive counsel.

The court set out the standard to be followed at 394, stat-

ing:

"Particularly on an arrangement as concerns the
right to counsel, an accused must be advised of
his right to counsel and his right to have counsel appointed at public expense if indigent,for
under our procedure the court must, before proceeding further, determine whether the accused
desires counsel, and if he does not desire counsel whether in truth and in fact as developed, as
developed by the record at that time, he has
knowledge of his rights and then has knowingly
and intelligently waived them." (Emphasis added)
-13-

The court further held that the fact in a previous
:ase in which appellant was the defendant he had been warned
L1at

he had a right to court-appointed counsel did not warrant

a finding that he had intelligently waived counsel in the
case before the court.
The facts in the Pharris case are very similar to this
case.

In 1942 and 1934 appellant had received court-appointed

counsel.

In both the Pharris case and this case the appel-

lants were not told of their right to court-appointed counsel
but in the past had received or were told of court-appointed
counsel.

In several other cases besides Pharris supra, the

Idaho Supreme Court has held that indigent defendants did
not waive their right to counsel because they were not told
of their right to court-appointed counsel, although they
were present when others were told of this right or were told
of this right outside of court.
In Bement v. State, 422 P.2d 55 (Ida. 1966), defendant

was present when others accused along with defendant were
. told of right to court-appointed counsel.

In Abercrombie v.

-

State, supra, the prosecuting attorney had told defendant
that when he got to district court an attorney would be appointed.

In these cases as in Pharris supra, the Idaho

Supreme Court held the circumstances mentioned did not
-14-

justif~

a finding of \

i_ ver

of counsel under federal constitutional

standards for \vaiver of counsel.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, the Supreme Court of
ilie United States in discussing the Constitutional standards
for waiver of counsel stated at p. 464:
"The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused."
The background, experiences and conduct of the appellant show that appellant has had an eighth grade education,
and has spent 34 of his 55 years in jail which has affected
his mental condition (R. 5).

Appellant was taking barbi-

turates and wine for a long period of time including the
~riod

of time in jail before entering his plea (R. 11-12).

Appellant was sent to the State Mental Hospital because the
judge did not know whether or not he was sane.
These facts about appellant indicate he has a difficult time understanding matters.

The transcript of the pro-

ceedings in Case 7231 shows appellant did not fully understand the proceedings.

For example, appellant answered

'guilty" when asked if he wanted a lawyer (T. 2).

1

Appellant's

testimony during the hearing on the petition further demon-15-

strates thc:it he did not understand his right to courtappointed counsel (R. 10, 11, 44).

Upon the basis of these

factors, appellant contends that the fact that he received
I

court-appointed counsel some twenty years earlier cannot
justify the conclusion that appellant knew of his right to
court-appointed counsel although not told of this right by
the judge.

other factors also affected appellant's decision to
~ive

his right to counsel.

Appellant testified that he

was threatened by officers that he would be prosecuted as
an habitual criminal if he did not plead guilty (R. 8).
This fear played a part in appellant's decision to waive
counsel and "a rejection of federal constitutional motivated by fear cannot • • • constitute an intelligent
waiver.~'

Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 164 ( 195 7).

The judge did not inform appellant of the nature of the
charge against him nor did he inquire as to whether there
was a factual basis for appellant's guilty plea.

Under

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a court
cannot accept a guilty plea without "• •• determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the
nature of the charge" and, " • • • without making such in-

-16-

quiry

0s

plc:i."
~

nuy SCltisfy it that there is factual basis for the

The United States Supreme Court has stated:

"To

valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of

the nature of the charges; the statutory offenses included
within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
, •• "

Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332

u.s. 708, 724 (1947).

Though not binding upon state criminal proceedings, Rule
11 was promulgated to insure a defendant's understanding
of the proceedings before entering a plea of guilty.

This

.lack of communication between appellant and the court
added to appellant's confusion at the time he stated he
waived counsel and entered his guilty plea.
The threats by police officers, appellant's mental
makeup, and the fact that the judge did not tell appellant
of his right to court-appointed counsel nor the nature of
the charge were the decisive factors in appellant's decision
to waive counsel and plead guilty.

It is contended that

appellant has met his burden of proof as stated in Syddal v.
~ner,

No. 10950, January 30, 1968, in showing that his

waiver of counsel was not "(v)oluntary and intelligently"
made under the standards of the Sixth Amendment.

-17-

POINT II
THE LOl:JER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SECTION
77-24-G' UTAH com: ANN<YI'ATED 1953, DOES N<YI' REQUIRE
THE JV '.: TO STATE TO A DEFENDANT THE MAXIMUl1 SENTENCE ·.. ICH CAN BE IMPOSED BEFORE ACCEPTING A
GUILTY PLEA.
In Case 7231 appellant was told by the judge that
a guilty plea carried vi th it a penitentiary sentence but
was not told the maximum sentence which could be imposed
upon a plea of guilty.

Appellant contends that Section

77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires that a defendant be told of the maximum penalty that can be imposed before the court can accept a guilty plea.
Section 77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states:
"Where the defendant is not represented by counsel,
the court shall not accept a plea of guilty until
it shall have explained to the defendant the consequences of such a plea."
The United States Supreme Court has previously set
out approximately the same rule as u.c.A. 77-24-G when it
stated:
"Out of just consideration for persons accused of
crimes, courts are careful that a plea of guilty
shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after
proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequ~nces." !'~c:-l1ibroda v. United States, 368 ·
U.S. 487, 493 (19G2) •
In Harper v.

.ited States, 368 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1966),

the court was faced with the issue as to scope of "conse-18-

quences"

United

uncler the Supreme Court rule in Machibroda v.

State~

--~------

supra.

The court stated at 53-54:

"Before accepting a plea of guilty the court should
either advise the defendant or be certain that defendant has been advised of the corsequences of
the plea of guilty.
One of the consequences, with respect to which
defendant should be advised is the maximum sentence which may be imposed on a plea of guilty .
• • • " (Emphasis added)
This court interpreted u.c.A. 77-24-6 in State v.
Banford 7 13 Utah 2d 63, 36 P.2d 473 (1962).

The court held

that the failure of the judge to inform defendant that the
plea of guilty carried with it a penitentiary sentence was
one of the consequences that defendant must be advised of
under u.c.A. 77-24-6.

The court cited Krolage v. People,

224 79 N.E. 470 (1906) as authority for its decision.

In

Krolage v. People, supra, the defendant was told by the judge
that he would receive a penitentiary sentence, but not the
length of time of the

~ntence.

The court held that the

explanation of the judge to the defendant that a guilty
plea carried a penitentiary sentence was not the only consequence that need be explained, but that the length of time
defendant might be sentenced also must be explained.

The

lower court misread State v. Banford, supra, and the legislative intent behind U.C.A. 77-24-6 by holding that the trial
-19-

judge need only inform a defendant that a guilty plea
carries a penitentiary sentence.

The length of the sentence

upan a plea of guilty is of vital concern to a defendant
faced with a crimbal charge.
The lower court stated in its order that it would have
been well that in strict compliance with law for the judge
to in£onn appellant of the maximum sentence, but that appel-

lant probably knew of the sentence because he had previously
served sentences on similar charges.

In People v. Washington,

5 Ill. 2d 58, 124 N.E. 890, 892 (1955), a case cited in State

v. Banford, supra, the court stated:
"The very purpose of Rule 27A (providing that
judge must tell defendant consequences of guilty
plea) is to provide a form of procedure eliminating any doubt that a plea of guilty was made with
£ull knowledge and understanding and to avoid the
method of procedure where a defendant's knowledge
and understanding were held to rest solely on
implications arising from the common law record.
To this end the rule has carefully spelled out
the information which must be conveyed to a defendant to give him full knowledge of the charge
against him, and leaves little if any, room for
indulgence in presumptions."
Section 76-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states that the
court shall explain the consequences of a guilty plea to a
defendant but makes no mention of presumed knowledge by the
defendant.

There is no indication in the proceedings in

Case 7231 of such knowledge by appellant.
-20-

Reversal is

POINT III
THE LO\vER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPElrLANT INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO JURY
TRIAL AND CONSEQUENTLY ENTERED A VOLUNTARY PLEA
'
OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF GRAND LARCENY IN 1966.
There is an increasing awareness by courts in general
:hat if injustice is to be avoided courts must be extremely
:areful when accepting pleas of guilty to inquire into the
i:isis of the plea and the circumstances surrounding the
In .Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962)

:ases.

Supreme Court stated at 493:

~he

"A guilty plea if induced

;y promises or threats which deprive it of character of an
1oluntary act, is void."
~oting

1926):

The court also stated at 493,

from Kercherral v. United States, 274 U.S. 220
"Out of just consideration for persons accused of

:rime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not ·
~

accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and

un

understanding of the consequences."
We contend that the Judge in Case No. 19678 faced

ith appellant whose mental abilities were clearly below
~rrnal

and faced with the circumstances of the case, did not

lke sufficient inquiry into the basis and reason for appelint' s plea of guilty to insure its voluntariness.

-21-

Appellant is a man who has an eighth grade education;
who previous to trial was taking barbiturates and wine; who
was given a sanity heal'.'ing in the case because of doubts of
his mental ability; who has spent nearly all of his adult
life in prison, all of which had affected his mental processes (R. 57).

He was threatened by police officers that

he would be prosecuted as an habitual criminal if he did not
plead guilty to grand larceny (R. 16); and was sitting in the
jury box while the prosecuting attorney, the judge and his
attorney were discussing his case, after which his attorney
told him he could plead guilty to grand larceny and get the
robbery charge dismissed (R. 49, 50).

Because of these

factors affecting appellant's mental abilities and because
of the fact he was nearby when a discussion about his case
was held between the judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel, it seems apparent appellant was influenced
when defense counsel came out of the discussions and said
to appellar:it, "we got a deal."

(R. 50).

The fact that

appellant knew the judge was involved when it was decided
that appellant could plead guilty to grand larceny and have
the robbery charge dropped, may have caused appellant to
plead guilty to the grand larceny charge, but the judge
made no inquiry into the reasons for appellant's change of
-22-

µle,=i to

0ui1t y.

lie

made no inquiry as to whether threats

cir µrornises had induced appellant to change his plea.

The American Bar Association project on Minimum
Stcu.Jards of Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, Sec. 3.3,

p. 71, 73, points out that the trial judge should not participate in pleas discussions.

The article states as follows:

"There are a number of valid reasons for keeping
a trial judge out of plea discussions including
the following: (1) judicial participation in the
discussions can create the impression in the mind
of the defendant that he would not receive a fair
trial were he to go to trial before this judge;
(2) judicial participation makes it difficult for
a judge objectively to determine the voluntariness
of the plea when it is offered; (3) judicial participation to the extent of promising a certain sentence is inconsistent with the theory behind the
case of the presentence investigation report (none
was used here) and (4) the thought of not going
with the disposition apparently desired by the
judge may seem so great to the defendant that he
will be induced to plead guilty. Comment, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 167, 180-183 (1964). Note 112 Pa. L.
Rev. 865, 891-892 (1964). Note 55 Colum. L. Rev.
366, 371 (1955)."
The validity of reasons 1 and 4 are clearly demonstrated by Case 19678 in which appellant's lack of education
and mental problems make clear the danger of possible influence on a defendant's plea by a judge who participated
in plea discussions.

In fact, in Case 19678 defense counsel

may have told appellant that the judge was in favor of
-23-

droppin<J the robbery charge upon a guilty plea to the grand
larceny charge
the

(H.

52).

Knowing how the judge felt about

case could have influenced the same manner as if appel-

lant hctd dealt directly with the judge on plea negotiations.
In United Sta,!:.es v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.
N. Y. 1966), the court held that a promise by the judge that
defendant would not receive more than ten years if he
pleaded

gui~ty

rendered the guilty plea involuntary.

The

court stated at 253:
"The issue (voluntariness of guilty pleas) does
not lend itself to precise mathematical determination; its resolution is one of fact which
involves an evaluation of psychological factors
and elements that may be reasonably calculated
to influence the human mind."
In Gilligan, supra, the judge dealt directly with the
defendant while in Case 19678 appellant knew of the judge's
involvement in the plea discussions while he waited in the
jury box.

To insure that appellant's guilty plea was not

based on a belief that the court wanted a guilty plea from

him, the judge should have inquired into the reasons for
appellant's guilty plea to determine its voll...mtariness.
Such an inquiry would have made certain that the judge's
role in the plea discussions was not the reason for appellant's guilty plea.
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f\pp"'lle:mt' s tcst:lmony was that he wanted a jury trial
.!.

17) and. his rncntality was suspect.

It is submitted

tkil the 101ver court erred in finding that appellant did

enter his plea of guilty voluntarily and erred in finding
the judge made sufficient inquiry as to the voluntariness

0f the guilty plea to insure that appellant made the plea
0:1

his own volition.

CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the record in Case 7231 that appellant did not waive his right to counsel under Sixth Amendment

standards and his plea of guilty was accepted in violation
of Section 77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

The record

also shows that appellant's plea was not voluntarily entered
in Case 19678.

It is therefore submitted that this court should reverse the decision of the lower court and grant appellant's
~tition

for writ of habeas corpus.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Services, Inc.
431 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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